Fraud examiners in white-collar crime investigations represent private policing of financial crime. Examiners in crime investigations reconstruct the past to create an account of who did what to make it happen or let it happen. This article addresses the following research question: What is the contribution from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime? Contributions are considered benefits from an investigation. Benefits should exceed costs to make private policing a profitable investment. Based on analysis of five U.S. cases and eight Norwegian cases, private policing does not seem profitable.
INTRODUCTION
When suspicions of misconduct and crime emerge in business and public organizations, private investigators are often hired to reconstruct the past. Private investigators are typically fraud examiners from major accounting firms and law firms. Examiners are hired to conduct a goal-oriented procedure of creating an account of what has happened, how it happened, why it happened, and who did what to make it happen or let it happen (Gottschalk, 2015) . When examiners move into the latter question of who did what to make it happen or let it happen, then the examination resembles a criminal investigation normally conducted by law enforcement in the police at local and national levels (Osterburg and Ward, 2014) .
Private policing by fraud examinations represents a privatization of law enforcement. Often, results from reports of private investigations are not communicated to public police, even when fraud examiners have collected solid evidence of law violations. There are many reasons for secrecy (Gottschalk, 2016a) . Especially in cases where top executives and investors and others from the elite are investigated for potential white-collar crime, then organizations tend to avoid public attention.
As a result, reports of investigations are difficult to find to evaluate the quality of private policing in cases of financial crime suspicions in general and white-collar crime suspicions in particular. After two years of searching in the United States and Norway, it was possible to obtain 13 reports and 40 reports respectively. 5 out of 13 fraud examinations in the United
States can be linked to white-collar crime, while 8 out of 40 fraud examinations in Norway can be linked to white-collar crime.
In this article, five U.S. reports and eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud examiners are evaluated to answer the following research question: What is the contribution from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime?
REPORTS OF INVESTIGATIONS
Fraud examiners conduct private inquiries into suspicions of white-collar crime. There is a small but growing body of research on private white-collar crime investigators. Brooks and Button (2011) and Button and Gee (2013) discuss police prosecutors potential dependence on private examinations of financial crime suspicion. They also discuss punishment and innocent victims of private investigations. In a survey by Brooks et al., (2009) , 17 out of 32 companies in the UK responded that they employ dedicated counter fraud staff, which in total accounted to 160 employees, while 13 had no specialist staff, and 2 did not answer the question. Button et al. (2007a Button et al. ( , 2007b and Tunley et al. (2014) discuss the lack of competence among fraud examiners. As argued by Gill and Hart (1997) , private policing is directly accountable to the paying customers rather than democratically elected bodies and tight legalistic procedures and constraints. Meerts (2014) found that corporations and organizations generally value the possibility of secrecy, discretion, and control that private investigations bring to corporate security. Openness could lead to problems such as reputational loss, which can have economic repercussions. In the same book edited by Walby and Lippert, Williams (2014) discusses the private eyes of corporate culture in terms of the forensic accounting and corporate investigation industry and the production of corporate financial security. Button et al. (2009) found that 68 % of fraud victims report strong feelings of anger.
Reports of investigations by fraud examiners are typically written at the final stage of private investigations. Reports are handed over to clients who pay for the work. Reports are seldom disclosed, so that the public never learn about them. Reports are often protected by the attorney-client privilege, when investigating firms are law firms. Therefore, it is quite a challenge to identify and obtain a sample of investigation reports to empirically evaluate and test convenience in white-collar crime. It is not easy to gain access to private investigation reports for research. This article documents findings from a sample of reports acquired in the United States as well as a sample of reports acquired in Norway. The samples are the result of non-probability purposive sampling, and thus we cannot confidently claim they represent all private investigations in neither the United States nor Norway. At the same time, the method of obtaining the reports included enough versatility in identifying the private investigation cases where investigators wrote reports, and seeking out these reports. Methods of identifying and obtaining reports included media coverage, digital searchers, tips from friends and colleagues, and student searches. Therefore, the samples can serve as tentative ways to get an approximate idea of the variety of white-collar crime suspicions being first detected or further investigated by private fraud examiners.
Reports of investigations vary in length. In the following samples, U.S. reports range from 12 pages to 874 pages, while Norwegian reports range from 4 pages to 555 pages. The shortest ones are typically summary reports or reports from very limited investigations.
A typical example of an investigation report is the report of investigation regarding procurement practices at the Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO) of the District 
Sample of U.S. Reports of Investigations by Fraud Examiners
The variety of financial crime suspicions is interesting to note in the table. Also, the variety in pages is interesting, where the Philadelphia investigation ended up as a thick book published by the Pennsylvania (1994) commission.
SAMPLE OF NORWEGIAN REPORTS
In the spring of 2014, it was possible to identify and obtain a total of 40 fraud examination reports as listed in the table. The listed reports are concerned with a variety of issues such as embezzlement by the chief executive officer in a church foundation and corruption in building maintenance in a municipality. 
# Case

Convenience theory applied to the U.S. sample of investigation reports
The first case is concerned with Yusuf Acar, who was convicted to prison for bribery, conspiracy, money laundering, and conflict of interest related to procurement improperties.
He exploited his position within the security division at the District of Columbia's Office of the Chief Technology Officer. In terms of convenience, Acar found it convenient to solve his problems in the economical dimension by means of white-collar crime. His problem or threat was that he had lost money as one of the owners of an information technology firm. He never got paid when he transferred his stocks to someone else. To complensate for his previous loss, he found it convenient to recover the loss by abusing his new position as a manager at DC's office of technology (Sidley, 2010) .
In the organizational dimension, Yusuf Acar went into a criminal partnership with vendors.
An important partner in crime was Sushil Bansal, the president and chief executive of a local Awan's role was phased out, while Bansal and Acar continued the arrangement on their own (Sidley, 2010) .
In the behavioral dimension, Acar explained that from his perspective, the arrangement provided him with a bonus payment for hiring individuals he would have hired anyway, and had the additional benefit of allowing him to do his job at OCTO more effectively by retaining more competent contractors (Sidley, 2010 The Committee on Government Operations in the District of Columbia charged Sidley (2010) with investigating Acar's procurement fraud at the office of the chief technology officer and recommending changes to the controls and procedures designed to assist in preventing fraudulent conduct of the type committed by Acar. While Acar was arrested and charged on March 12, 2009, the committee authorized the investigation on April 2, 2009. Since the private investigation was initiated after the public arrest, the question arises whether or not Sidley (2010) was able to reveal new facts and evidence that were not already known to the public prosecutor. While the report of investigation details various fraud schemes applied by Acar, it seems that nothing new emerges from Sidley's investigation. The only contribution seems to be that a chronological sequence of events is documented in the report. When the report is evaluated as an investment, where examiners' costs have to be compared to potential benefits, the only benefits seem to be recommendations starting on page 37 and ending on page 43 in the report. Most -if not all -recommendations are quite obvious.
The Board of Directors at Enron charged Powers et al. (2002) with investigating transactions between Enron and investment partnerships created and managed by Andrew S. Fastow, Enron's former executive vice president and chief financial officer, and by other Enron executives who worked with Fastow. The mandate is different from the focus of the public prosecutor, and investigators were able to explain the substance of the most significant transactions and highlight their most important accounting, corporate governance, management oversight, and public disclosure issues. However, as argued by examiners Powers et al. (2002: 1) , "An exhaustive investigation of these related-party transactions would require time and resources beyond those available." Furthermore, "Certain former Enron employees who (we were told) played substantial roles in one or more of the transactions under investigation -including Fastow, Michael J. Kopper, and Ben F. Glisan, Jr. -declined to be interviewed either entirely or with respect to some issues. We have had only limited access to certain work papers of Arthur Andersen LLP, Enron's outside auditors, and no access to materials in the possession of the Fastow partnerships or their limited partners.
Information from these sources could affect our conclusions." Given these limitations, results from the private investigation documented in the examiners' report are questionable. (2008) were able to report convincing answers to the three questions. Consequently, the benefits of the investigation seem to be substantial, while the costs may not have been that large. Costbenefit in this investigation seems to be a favorable ratio.
The Board of Directors of WorlCom charged Wilmer and PwC (2003) with investigating accounting irregularities at WorldCom including certain actions by the board of directors or its members, including the authorization of large loans and guaranties by WorldCom to CEO Ebbers. The scope of the authority granted to investigators was very broad, making it necessary for them to refine and focus their undertaking. Wilmer and PwC (2003: 35) conclude that in sum, "WorldCom was a company driven overwhelmingly by a perceived need to meet unrealistic securities market expectations that its own executives had fostered, without any institutional culture in which integrity was valued, without the benefit of policies and procedures covering important matters of governance, and without effective oversight of an active and engaged board of directors. It was headed by a chief executive officer with a dominant personality, who was able to act largely unchecked. The chief financial officerhimself a strong figure -could direct employees to take action they knew or believed was improper, and the employees would comply." This is interesting, but certainly no news in 2003. Already the year before, WorldCom admitted to four billion dollars in accounting misstatement. This initiated a series of police investigations and public legal proceedings, which focused on Bernard Ebbers. It seems that the only benefit from the Wilmer and PwC The District Court of Stavanger charged Vierdal (2012) with investigating the Lunde bankruptcy. The bankruptcy lawyers were able to identify misconduct and potential crime that was later publicly prosecuted in court. Therefore, the extended bankruptcy audit may represent a profitable investment.
The Board of Directors at Romerike Water Supply charged Distriktsrevisjonen (2007) with investigating fraud by the chief executive officer and other key actors. The private investigators followed up on newspaper accounts concerning misconduct and crime. They found substantial evidence of white-collar crime, and evidence was handed over to the police.
In the sequence of events, it seems that the private investigation represented a profitable investment.
The City of Oslo charged Kommunerevisjonen (2006a Kommunerevisjonen ( , 2006b ) with investigating two independent fraud suspicions in the same organizational unit. Investigators did not provide any information or insight that was not already known to the city and public prosecutors at that time. Therefore, these two investigations seem to result in negative cost-benefit analysis.
CONCLUSION
In a perspective of comparative criminal justice, this article has presented empirical evidence from both Norway and the United States. There seems to be no relevant differences between legislation or private investigations in the two nations, making the findings comparable.
An investment is only profitable if benefits exceed costs. Cost-benefit analysis for an investment is concerned with whether or not the investment is profitable. When cost-benefit analysis is applied to private policing of financial crime in terms of fraud examiners in whitecollar crime investigations, then it should be expected that benefits exceed costs. In this article, five U.S. reports and eight Norwegian reports of investigations from fraud examiners were evaluated to answer the following research question: What is the contribution from fraud examiners in private investigative policing of white-collar crime? Contributions were here defined as benefits from investigations. In our sample, most investigations had limited contributions, and costs seem to have exceeded benefits, thereby making private policing an unprofitable investment in most cases.
